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This paper shall investigate Yuen protocol, so called Y-00, which can realize a randomized stream
cipher with high bit rate(Gbps) for long distance(several hundreds km). The randomized stream
cipher with randomization by quantum noise based on Y-00 is called quantum stream cipher in
this paper, and it may have security against known plaintext attacks which has no analog with
any conventional symmetric key ciphers. We present a simple cryptanalysis based on an attacker’s
heterodyne measurement and the quantum unambiguous measurement to make clear the strength
of Y-00 in real communication. In addition, we give a design for the implementation of an intensity
modulation scheme and report the experimental demonstration of 1 Gbps quantum stream cipher
through 20 km long transmission line.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Lc
I. INTRODUCTION
It is very difficult to devise encryption schemes with
”provable security” in the conventional cryptography. So
far we have two schemes for encryption with provable se-
curity. One of methods is one time pads supported by the
quantum key distribution. The other is a kind of random-
ized stream cipher. Recently, most of the efforts to realize
the encryption with provable security have been devoted
to the quantum key distribution invented by C.Bennett
and G.Brassard in 1984[1]. We emphasize the greatness
of this achievement which opened a new scientific realm.
However, there is a big gap between the experimental
realization and the real communication network require-
ment. In addition, unfortunately one may say there is no
practical unconditionally secure protocol that has ever
even been theoretically proposed. Furthermore, any kind
of quantum repeater cannot guarantee high key rate. The
key rate decreases exponentially with respect to the dis-
tance[2]. This might be equivalent to no repeater scheme.
Even if the quantum repeater with a quantum media
transform is employed[3], the improvement is so little,
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because no perfect quantum efficiency of media transfor-
mation exists. There is no means of improving such a
poor performance. So we would like to point out that
the key generation is very important, but is very narrow
minded to define quantum cryptography only by BB-84
and similar principle[4]. Thus, it is preferable to investi-
gate a quantum symmetric key cipher with information
theoretic security based on quantum/optical communi-
cation. In 2000, Yuen announced that his new protocol
so called Yuen protocol (Y-00) may provide a random-
ized stream cipher with information theoretic security by
randomization based on quantum noise and additional
mathematical schemes[5, 6]. This scheme is called quan-
tum stream cipher, or αη scheme by the Northwestern
University group. In conventional cryptography, there is
no known complexity-based proof at all on any scheme
under known plaintext attacks on key. It is an interest-
ing subject to show, by the concrete scheme, that the
quantum stream cipher by Y-00 has a potential of the
information theoretic security against known plaintext
attacks.
In the proceedings of SPIE in Denver[7] and of Quan-
tum Informatics in Moscow[8], we gave a framework of
the concrete security analysis for quantum stream cipher
by Y-00. In this paper, we shall show how to apply the
results of these papers [7,8] to security analysis, and a
design and experimental demonstration of the quantum
stream cipher by an intensity modulation. However, the
general proof of the security of the quantum stream ci-
pher by Y-00 still remains. The direction of the proof
2has been suggested by Yuen in his paper[6].
II. INFORMATION THEORETICALLY SECURE
STREAM CIPHER
First, we will denote the definition of the information
theoretic security. Let us assume that the eavesdropper
Eve has the following abilities.
(i) She has the computer with unlimited computation
power
(ii) She has the unlimited memory capacity
When Eve cannot decode plaintext or key even if she
has the above computational power, the cryptography is
information theoretically secure. Many works on proto-
col with information theoretic security have been already
published in journals of information theory and cryptog-
raphy. In the following, we will introduce some examples.
A. One time pad
The definition of perfect secrecy, that is information
theoretic security against any kind of the criteria, is
H(X |Y ) = H(X), where X and Y are plaintext and ci-
phertext, respectively. It means that the plaintext X and
the ciphertext Y as a function of X are statistically in-
dependent. In order to realize such a perfect secrecy, the
condition: H(X) ≤ H(K) is required[9], whenever Eve
has an access to precisely the same information as the
legitimate users. This situation, in which Eve and Bob
can get the same ciphertext, is reasonable in the conven-
tional communication network. In this situation, one of
methods to realize the perfect secrecy is one time pad or
Vernum cipher which is a kind of stream cipher. How-
ever, as mentioned above, it requires the secret key which
is at least as long as the plaintext message. If the infinite
key for one time pad can be sent through secure commu-
nication, then the one time pad makes sense in the real
communications. So far, many researchers in quantum
information science have proposed protocols in order to
realize a secure key distribution which are guaranteed by
quantum effect in communication process. BB-84, E-91,
and B-92 are typical examples of such protocols.
B. Randomized stream cipher
In the conventional cryptosystem, the stream cipher
is implemented by a pseudo random number generator
with short secret key and XOR operation with plaintext
data bit. For a symmetric key cipher as a direct data
encryption, the main criteria of the security are given as
follows.
(i) Ciphertext-only attack(CTA) on data and on key:
To get plaintext or key, Eve can know only the
ciphertext from her measurement.
(ii) Known/chosen plaintext attack(KTA): To get key,
Eve can know non-uniform statistics for some plain-
texts and corresponding ciphertexts, or insert cho-
sen plaintext data into the modulation system( for
example, inserts all 0 sequence as plaintext in some
periods). Then Eve tries to determine the key from
input-output. Using the key, Eve can determine the
remained data from the ciphertexts.
(iii) Repetition attack: Since the secret key is fixed, it
has a period. Eve can apply CTA and KTA over
many periods when the key is reused.
We can summarize the performance of the conventional
stream cipher by the unicity distance defined by Shan-
non[9]. For the ciphertext only attack on key, the unicity
distance is as follows:
nu = min{n : H(K|Y n) = 0} (1)
For the known plaintext attack, it can be modified into
nGu = min{n : H(K|Y n, Xn) = 0} (2)
As an example, the unicity distance is sometimes given
as follows:
nu ∼ H(X)
D
(3)
where D is the redundancy of the plaintext sequence.
When the statistics of plaintext is uniform, the unicity
distance becomes infinite. Shannon called ciphers with
nu =∞ ”ideal cipher”. This is the information theoretic
security against ciphertext only attacks on data. How-
ever, the unicity distance of many conventional stream
ciphers against known plaintext attacks is finite and some
times it is
uGu ∼ H(K) (4)
For example, let us use a linear feed back shift regis-
ter(LFSR) as a pseudo random number generator. Eve
can know the secret key when she get 2|K| bits (key
and shift parameter uncertainty) as the running key from
a pseudo random generator. Thus the stream cipher is
surely broken by a brute force attack only for known
plaintext attacks, but not for ciphertext only attacks and
not for known non-uniform plaintext statistics attacks
when the length of known plaintext is smaller than the
unicity distance. Although there are several proposals
which have better performance than that of Eq(4), no
one succeed to show the lower bound. Again, the sym-
metric key ciphers are in principle insecure. This derives
from the fact that the security is given only by key un-
certainty.
There is another theoretical issue in the discussions
on the information theoretically secure stream cipher. It
3is called ”randomized stream cipher”, which was long
known, even to Gauss. The randomized stream cipher
means that ciphertexts are randomized. In the mod-
ern cryptography, they are designed based on informa-
tion theoretic approach, and are discussed by C.Schnorr,
Diffie, Maurer, and Cachin[10]. Maurer devised a ran-
domized stream cipher for which one can prove that
Eve obtains no information in Shannon’s sense about the
plaintext with probability close 1. But his protocol works
under the assumption that memory capacity of Eve is
limited[11]. This approach provides an information the-
oretic notion of security under a computational restric-
tion. However, unfortunately, it is difficult to implement
the practical system with high speed processing. Thus,
it is very difficult to realize the information theoretically
secure symmetric key cipher based only on mathemati-
cal algorithm. Yuen, however, points out that it may be
possible when one employs randomization by quantum
noise. In the following sections, we will show the con-
crete scheme and the performance of Yuen protocol so
called Y-00.
III. QUANTUM COMMUNICATION FOR
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
In any quantum cryptography such as BB-84, B-92,
E-91, and Y-00, information is classical bit sequence.
That is, information is the true random bits for the
key distribution, and the plaintext bits for the direct
data encryption. The essential assumption in quantum
communication for classical information is that quantum
states are known to the legitimate users. So classical
bits are mapped into a set of known quantum states.
They are transmitted passing through a completely posi-
tive map (cp-map), and discriminated by quantum mea-
surement process described by positive operator valued
measure(POVM). Then, a receiver gets classical bits
as information by measurements. This model is called
Helstrom/Holevo/Yuen formalism for the quantum com-
munication[12,13,14]. Let us give a brief introduction.
Source and output in the quantum communication model
are described by a density operator for ensemble of quan-
tum states which conveys classical information as follows:
ρTin =
∑
piρi, ρTout =
∑
piǫ(ρi), (5)
where i is an index corresponding to symbol as classi-
cal information, and ǫ is a cp-map. The discrimination
among quantum states at the output of the channel is
described by POVM.
Πj ≥ 0,
∑
Πj = I, (6)
where I is an unit operator. Then a conditional proba-
bility for each trial of the measurement is given by
P (j|i) = Trǫ(ρi)Πj . (7)
The minimization problem of the average error proba-
bility based on the above equation is called quantum
detection theory, which is a fundamental formalism in
quantum information science.
Pe = min
Π
{1−
∑
piTrǫ(ρi)Πi} (8)
The complete theory has been given by Helstrom,
Holevo, and Yuen. As a result, we have [12, 13, 14]
Theorem 1: Signals with non-orthogonal states
cannot be distinguished without error and optimum lower
bounds for error rate exist.
When the error probability is 1/2, there is no way
to distinguish them. The other important one is no
cloning theorem clarified by Wootters-Zurek, Yuen, and
Buzek-Hillery [15] as follows.
Theorem 2:
Non-orthogonal states cannot be cloned with perfect
fidelity and with probability 1
The most important cp-map (communication chan-
nel) in the real world is energy loss channel with
20 ∼ 100dB loss. A selection of input quantum states for
the channel is one of interesting problems in quantum
communications. But we have the following result[16].
Theorem 3: The input state which keeps pure state
passing through energy loss channel is only coherent
state.
So we can understand that a desirable state is a
coherent state. The question is whether a coherent state
is appropriate or not when we take into account two
criteria: the efficiency and the security as requirements
to quantum communication for quantum cryptography.
Y-00 protocol will verify that the communication by a
coherent state can satisfy these two criteria.
IV. YUEN PROTOCOL:Y-00
A. Basic concept
A symmetric key cipher is a scheme that the legiti-
mate users, Alice and Bob, share a secret key. A block
cipher and a part of stream ciphers belong to this cate-
gory. However, they are in principle insecure, because the
security is given only by key uncertainty. The problem
is whether we can realize the information theoretically
secure cipher under a coherent state system with the fi-
nite secret key. In the quantum communication model for
quantum cryptography, we have to consider two channels
of Alice-Bob, and of Alice-Eve. Let us describe them by
ǫAB, ǫAE. In general, ǫAE is an ideal channel while ǫAB
is a noisy channel. Even so, the basic performance of
4cryptography is to prevent the leak of secret information
from channel of legitimate users. In a physical cryptogra-
phy like quantum cryptography, one may take a method
to eliminate Eve’s information obtained by her measure-
ment from ǫAE . In order to realize such a situation, one
needs ”advantage creation” under the ultimate physical
law. It means that the disadvantage of Bob can be got
rid of by some processing, while the performance of Eve,
who has the unlimited power of computer and physical
resources, is superior to that of Bob’s in the original sit-
uation.
According to quantum detection theory we have the
following properties for the average error probability:
Pe(BP ) < Pe(BM), Pe(BP ) < Pe(MP ) (9)
where BP , BM , MP mean binary pure state, binary
mixed state, and M -ary pure state, respectively. The
problem is how to apply the above principle of the
quantum detection theory to cryptography. Yuen
proposes a protocol which combines a shared secret
key for the legitimate users and specific quantum state
modulation scheme. This can be called initial shared key
advantage in a noisy channel. By this advantage, the
legitimate users can establish ”the advantage creation”
under parameters with the finite size in the protocol for
noisy channel. As a result, one can see a basic principle
to guarantee the security as follows[6]:
Principle of security : The optimum quantum
measurements with key and without key have different
performance.
An unknown key corresponds to the classical random-
ness. The security of the conventional symmetric key
cipher is guaranteed by this classical randomness. How-
ever, in Yuen protocol, a classical randomness is used to
make a difference in the performances of quantum mea-
surements. It means that if Eve does not know the key,
the quantum limitation of her measurement is enhanced
by the classical randomness. As a result, Eve has to
search for the data or the key based on her measurement
results with the unavoidable error. For an explanation of
this principle, Yuen gives a simple example in the case
without any design as follows[6]; Let us assume that the
information source is binary coherent states, and the ul-
timate error performances for a receiver with key or with-
out key are
Pe
B ∼ exp(−4S) vs PeE ∼ exp(−2S) (10)
where S =< n > is signal photon per pulse. These are
the error rates derived from the condition that the key
is known to Eve after her measurement, or that she uses
her measurement result to pin down the data for vari-
ous different possible key values. This fact gives us an
advantage creation under the ultimate physical law, so
it leads to the unconditionally secure key generation for
the any key length of the initial key, and it also gives a
basis for information theoretically secure direct data en-
cryption. The above example is not what we use as a
practical quantum cryptography. It only shows a prin-
ciple. For the practical use, we need several additional
contrivances. The essential problem is how to extend the
above principle towards the practical quantum cryptog-
raphy.
The first idea was proposed as follows[17,18]. Let us
prepareM sets of two coherent states with a phase differ-
ence π. These are the basis for the transmission of data.
We assume that Alice and Bob share a secret key K.
The key is stretched by a pseudo random number gen-
erator(PRNG). Let K ′ be the pseudo random number
from PRNG. The random decimal number with modM
generated from the block:
K ′/ log2M ≡ K¯ ′ = (k¯1′, k¯2′, . . .) (11)
of pseudo random number is called the running key. A
basis is randomly selected by the running key K¯ ′. The
data bit is transmitted by the selected basis. The num-
bering of the basis set is {1, 2, 3. . . .} from around θ = 0
to θ = π on the phase space. As a result, the M -ary key-
ing has M different basis based on 2M coherent states.
So the data bit is mapped into one of 2M coherent states
randomly, but of course its modulation map has the def-
inite relationship, which is opened. Bob knows the key
and the running key, so his measurement is always the
correct binary detection for signals with large signal dis-
tance. Since Eve does not know the key, she has to em-
ploy basically M -ary detection or other methods. But
these are not better than Bob’s measurement.
B. Signal design
Alice and Bob in Y-00 share a secret key K. The
key is stretched by a pseudo random number generator.
The length of the running key is |K ′|. The data bit is
modulated by M -ary keying driven by random decimal
numbers generated from the block K¯ ′ = (k¯1
′
, k¯2
′
, . . .) of
pseudo random number. So the data bit is mapped into
one of 2M coherent states randomly. Quantum state
sequences emitted from the transmitter can be described
as follows:
|Ψ〉 = |αj〉1|αk〉2|αl〉3 . . . (12)
where |αj〉 is one of 2M coherent states, αj = αjc+ iαjs,
and j, k, l ∈ M = (1 ∼ 2M). In the phase modula-
tion scheme (PSK), the coherent states are described by
positions on a circle in the phase space representation.
The radius corresponds to the amplitude or the average
photon number per pulse at the transmitter. The posi-
tions on the circle correspond to phase information of the
light wave. If the number of basis is M , then the signal
distance between neighboring states is about
∆PM ∼= 2π|α|
2M
(13)
5On the other hand, for amplitude modulation scheme
(ASK), it is given by
∆AM =
|αmax − αmin|
2M
(14)
For direct intensity modulation of laser diode,
∆IM =
|αmax|2 − |αmin|2
2M
(15)
where αmax and αmin are the maximum and the mini-
mum amplitude, respectively. The quantum noise of a
coherent state is described by two-dimensional Gaussian
distribution of variance:1/2 each, or a one-dimensional
Gaussian of variance:1/4, if one heterodynes or homo-
dynes respectively. Alice and Bob will design the number
of basis which satisfies
Pe(i, i+ 1) =
1
2
− 1√
2π
∫ t0
0
exp(−t2/2)dt = 0.2 ∼ 0.5
(16)
where t0 = ∆PM/2 =
pi|α|
2M for the phase modulation
scheme, and t0 = ∆AM/2 for amplitude or intensity mod-
ulation scheme. This corresponds to the error probability
between neighboring states. But it is not real error prob-
ability of Eve. The real error probability of Eve depends
on her strategy and quantum measurement scheme. It is
easy to show the numerical examples of the error prob-
ability between neighboring states with respect to signal
power and number of basis in amplitude or intensity mod-
ulation scheme. For example, Pe(i, i + 1) is about 0.45
when |αmax| = 100, |αmin| = 80, and M = 100.
V. KNOWN/CHOSEN PLAINTEXT ATTACK
A general framework of attacks on data and on key in
the stream cipher is explained in the reference [19], in
which the probability distribution of the plaintext mes-
sage in ciphertext only attacks is uniform, according to
the attacker, and it is non-uniform in known plaintext at-
tacks. If Eve knows the deterministic plaintext, it corre-
sponds to the chosen plaintext attack. We are concerned
with the security when Eve can insert her deterministic
plaintext. So in this section, our discussions will be de-
voted to the chosen plaintext attack which is the special
case of known plaintext attacks.
A. Heterodyne measurement
Let us consider the stream cipher by the general PRNG
of the unicity distance uGn = f(|K|), where f(|K|) is a
function of |K|. The conventional stream cipher has the
following structure.
ci = xi ⊕ ki′ (17)
where ki
′ is running key. In this case, if Eve knows some
plaintexts (xi ∈ Xˆ ) and corresponding ciphertext bit
sequence, the output sequence as the ciphertext corre-
sponds to the running key. If Eve knows the plaintext
bits of |Xˆ | = f(|K|) and corresponding ciphertext bits,
she can determine the secret key by the well-known al-
gorithm, and can decode plaintext of the remained bits
sequence:
|K ′| − f(|K|), (18)
When the PRNG is a LFSR, f(|K|) = 2|K| − 1, and
|K ′| ∼ 2|K| . Since, in general, the f(|K|) is finite in the
conventional stream ciphers, they are not secure.
In the case of the quantum stream cipher, the quantum
noise effect is unavoidable, because the signal structure
in Y-00 protocol to any kind of measurement of Eve has
the signal set of non-orthogonal states. In addition, the
running key is the decimal number. So Eve cannot get
exact ciphertext from her measurement. Here we assume
that Eve can get all energy of light wave from the trans-
mitter at the point close to Alice, and she employs the
heterodyne measurement. By the heterodyne measure-
ment, Eve measures the quadrature amplitudes αc and αs
putting known plaintext to decide which basis was used.
Since the quadrature amplitudes are non-commutative,
the heterodyne measurement corresponds to the simul-
taneous measurement of non-commuting observables. So
the quantum noise is described by the variance 1/2. Let
us assume that the the signal power is large, and the
number of basis is large enough. At that time, even if
the measured number for the basis is 5, the true num-
ber can be 3 or 7. On the other hand, when we employ
the overlapping selection keying(OSK) as the modula-
tion randomization[7], the errors of measured data of Eve
are induced mainly for the neighboring quantum states.
That is, even if the measured number for the basis is 5,
the true number can be 4 or 6. These are the minimum
requirement for our design. So the error of the basis will
be J > 3, where J is the number of error basis. Since
the quantum error for each measurement is statistically
independent, in the individual measurement, the number
of combination for f(|K|)/ log2M slots which correspond
to f(|K|) bits in the output of the PRNG is given by
Q ∼= Jf(|K|)/ log2 M . (19)
After the measurement, Eve has to transform the deci-
mal number with error into the bit sequence, and start
the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm or several known al-
gorithms. Since Eve’s data contain error by quantum
noise, she cannot get the true secret key from the cal-
culation by the algorithm based only on one trial of the
known/chosen plaintext attack. So Eve cannot decode
the remained ciphertext sequence.
Here, if Eve can make Q copies of the output se-
quence of coherent states by cloning procedure, she can
try the brute force attack on Q copies, comparing the
known/chosen plaintext and each decoded data[7,20].
The near optimum cloning for the coherent state se-
quence is the beam splitter scheme. It means that Eve
6has to copy the sequence by means of division of the out-
put light from Alice by Q beam splitters. So the copies
are described as follows:
|Ψ〉 = |α
j
Q
〉|α
k
Q
〉|α
l
Q
〉 . . .
|Ψ〉 = |α
j
Q
〉|α
k
Q
〉|α
l
Q
〉 . . .
|Ψ〉 = |α
j
Q
〉|α
k
Q
〉|α
l
Q
〉 . . . (20)
...
Here, when we assume that α = 100 ∼ 1000, M = 100 ∼
2000, |K| = 100 ∼ 1000, the amplitude of the coherent
state of Eve becomes α/Q ∼ 0. That is, the signal to
noise ratio is zero. So Eve cannot get any information
by the measurement or apply known/chosen plaintext
attacks.
On the other hand, let us consider that Eve knows the
plaintexts of more than Z bits defined by the following
equation:
Z ≡ f(|K|)
log2M
Q. (21)
In this case, the number of bits of the known/chosen
plaintext, which Eve needs, increases exponentially with
respect to the key length. Let |K ′| be the output bit
length of the PRNG, and let us assume that the com-
munication is stopped at a period of the PRNG. If the
number of the bits Z is
Z << |K ′|/ log2M, (22)
Eve may find the true key by Q-times measurements us-
ing possible Q keys and input-output data, because the
number of keys is reduced to be Q by the first measure-
ment for f(|K|)/ log2M bit. As an example, when the
PRNG is the LFSR,
Z ∼= (2|K| − 1)
log2M
J (2|K|−1)/ log2 M < 2|K| − 1. (23)
As a result, Eve can find the key at least by the
brute force search. So the original scheme of Y-
00 is the exponentially-search-based security against
known/chosen plaintext attacks, when the power of the
transmitter is large. However, if a PRNG provides
Z > |K ′|/ log2M, (24)
the brute force attack cannot be completed in a period
of the PRNG. As a result, the success probability of the
attack with exponential number of the known/chosen
plaintext does not become the unity. We shall here
show an example. If we employ the non-linear feedback
shift register (NFSR) such as ”de Brujin sequence” as
the pseudo random generator[10], there exists a sequence
with f(|K|) >> 2|K| and the period 2|K|. In this case,
we get
Z >> 2|K|/ log2M, (25)
We should emphasize that the security of the PRBG is
not essential for the security of Y-00. We only need the
large linear complexity, because the security of Y-00 is
guaranteed by preventing the trial of the brute force at-
tack itself.
On the other hand, even if we employ the LFSR, it is
easy to provide the relation of the Eq(24) by additional
randomizations[6,7] such as the breaking of phase locking
or the rotation of the axis of the phase plain in the phase
modulation scheme, and the sifting of the center line of
the amplitude in the intensity modulation scheme. As a
result, we have
Q ∼=M2|K|/ log2 M = 22|K|. (26)
So again the brute force attack cannot be completed
in a period of the PRNG. Thus, if the attack is only
the brute force attack, it is at least secure during about
|K ′|/ log2M data bits, even if Eve has the infinite power
of computing and the infinite memory capacity. This
means that the quantum stream cipher with an appropri-
ate design is secure against the known/chosen plaintext
attack, if Eve can only carry out the brute force attack
under the heterodyne measurement.
On the reuse of the key, for LFSR with |K| = 100, the
legitimate users need not to change the key for more than
1012 years, when the bit rate of the modulator is 1 Gbps.
So the quantum stream cipher has no problem with the
repetition of the secret key whenever the PRNG is not
reset.
B. Indirect measurement
There is a possibility of the attack based on indirect
measurements and post processing which can reduce the
quantum noise effect. In fact, there have been some crit-
icisms against Y-00 based on such an indirect measure-
ment[21], but they are wrong. Here we analyze the sub-
jects related to those criticisms. The typical method of
the reduction of noise effects is to measure indirect ob-
servable of the signal, which a certain modulation scheme
connects. Indeed, the M -ary keying is taken to be
li = xi ⊕ k˜i (27)
where li is one of two regions separated by an appropriate
axis on the phase space or on the line of the strength of
the amplitude. If the fundamental axis is horizontal, l0
is upper plain, l1 is down plain, xi is data bit. k˜i is 0 for
even number and 1 for odd number in the running key
of M -ary assignment [7,17]. For example, (li = up, k˜i =
even)→ x = 1, (up, odd) → x = 0, (down, even) → x =
0, (down, odd)→ x = 1. However, we should denote that
7k˜i is the result of the mapping from the running key of
decimal number as follows:
k¯i
′
= 1, 3, 5, . . .→ k˜i = 1
k¯i
′
= 2, 4, 6, . . .→ k˜i = 0 (28)
The essential point of the attack is to measure indirect
observable li. However, since the observable does not
contain the information of the data bit, Eve has to try
the brute force attack on data in the ciphertext only at-
tack. Moreover, the error of the measurement for li is
unavoidable. That is, the density operators of signal sets
for up and down measurement are
ρup =
∑
up
1
M
|αi〉〈αj |, (29)
ρdown =
∑
down
1
M
|αj〉〈αj | (30)
It is easy to show the quantum limit, which is the
most rigorous lower bound of error probability for this
signal[12,22]. When the coherent state is mesoscopic
< n >∼ 10000 and one thousand of M in the phase
modulation scheme, the error is about 0.1 percent. As
a result, we have H(X |Y ) > H(K). If we employ an
additional randomization, the error becomes 1/2.
In the case of the known/chosen plaintext attack, even
if the system is error-free, then the measurement results
of li only tell whether the running key is even or odd.
Eve cannot get the true running key from the informa-
tion of whether it is even or odd. Besides, the system is
not error-free. So it does not work. The above results
will deny several criticisms based on the noise reduction
by the indirect measurement method. The detailed dis-
cussion is also given in the reference [23].
C. Quantum unambiguous measurement
Let us discuss the chosen plaintext attack based on a
collective quantum unambiguous measurement. Again,
Eve knows plaintexts of 2|K| − 1 bits, and she prepares
the quantum unambiguous measurement which can be
applied to quantum state sequences of (2|K|− 1)/ logM .
When one of quantum state sequences of the set is
transmitted from Alice, Eve will measure it by her
unambiguous measurement. The success probability is
evaluated by an exact calculation and also the following
property[8].
Remark. The upper bound of average success probability
in the quantum unambiguous measurement is smaller
than the quantum optimum solution in the quantum
detection theory for the same state ensemble.
The quantum unambiguous measurement (QUM)
for M symmetric coherent states is formulated by
A.Chefles and S.M.Barnett[24]. The success probability
is given by the following formula.
PD(QUM) =M min
k=1,2,3,...,M
|ck|2 (31)
where
|ck|2 = 1
M
M∑
j=1
e2piijk/M e|α|
2(e2piij/M−1) (32)
In fact, in the case of the individual measurement, the
success probability of the quantum unambiguous mea-
surement on M=2000 symmetric coherent states with
(|α|2 =< n >= 10000) is given by S.van Enk [25] as
follows:
PD(QUM) = 3x10
−12 <
1
M
= 5x10−4
< PD(Bayes) ∼ 2x10−1 (33)
where 1/M is a pure guessing. And also, the success
probability for collective QUM is given by
PD(QUM) ∼ 0 < 2−|K| < PD(Bayes) (34)
Thus, the success probability is less than that of pure
guessing. So in general it does not work.
VI. COMMUNICATION DISTANCE
Here, we analyze how long we can communicate under
such a secure condition. Let us assume that the ampli-
tude attenuation parameter of channel between Alice and
Bob is κ. The amplitude of Bob is given by κα. When
the situation is as follows:
κα >
α
Q
, (35)
even if Eve has a correct key, the error is greater than
that of Bob. The signal distance for Bob in the case of
phase modulation is given by
dP = 2κ|α| (36)
and, that for the intensity modulation is
dI =
1
2
κ2(|αmax|2 − |αmin|2) (37)
If there is no device noise, the error probability of Bob is
given by dP or dI . The attenuation parameter κ, which
can keep as follows:
Pe
B < Pe
E , (38)
determines the communication distance. As a result,
the scheme of the intensity modulation can communicate
within at least 100 km with 1 Gbps. The application of
the optical amplifier will be reported in the subsequent
paper. See also the reference [19].
8VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
Several demonstrations of the quantum stream cipher
by phase modulation have been reported by the North-
western University group[17,18,19]. We would like to re-
alize the quantum stream cipher by the intensity modula-
tion[7,8] which is widely used in the conventional optical
fiber network system. In order to verify the excellent
feature of Y-00 by the intensity modulation scheme, we
show experiment which was done by the Panasonic and
our group announced at March 30, 2005.
Let us give again a brief explanation of the scheme.
The maximum and minimum amplitudes of the trans-
mitter are fixed. We divide it into 2M . So we have
M sets of basis state {(A1, A2), (B1, B2), . . .}. The total
set of basis states is shown in Fig.1. Here, the output
intensities are square of each amplitudes. In addition,
we employ OSK[7] which means that data bits are sent
by switching randomly each basis: (A1 = 0, A2 = 1) or
(A1 = 1, A2 = 0), (B1 = 0, B2 = 1) or (B1 = 1, B2 = 0),
and so on. The system consists of the distributed-
feedback laser diode of the wavelength λ = 1.550µm
and photo diode which works under the 10 Gbps and the
room temperature. The linearity of the laser diode can
be applicable to the analog modulation and the number
of basis :M are controlled from 100 to 200. The out-
put power of the laser diode is 0 dBm at the continuous
operation, and the launch power is kept between about
-25 ∼ -20 dBm by the attenuator. The running key is
generated by the hardware LFSR with the secret key of
20 bits. The data rate for the modulation is 1 Gbps,
and the transmission line is about 20 km spool of single
mode fiber. The decision levels of the decoding system of
Bob are automatically controlled by the hardware LFSR
with the same secret key as the transmitter. In addition,
the systems of three parties are completely synchronized.
The difference is only with key or without key. As a re-
sult, the detection scheme of Bob is binary, and that of
Eve is M -ary.
In this experiment, we assumed that the technology
level of Bob and Eve would be the same one. Figure
2 shows the eye patterns for encrypted 1 Gbps of Bob
(top) who knows the key and of Eve (bottom) who does
not know the key, respectively. This scheme corresponds
to ciphertext only attack for Eve. In these experiments,
Bob is located at the end of the 20 Km-long line and Eve
is located at the transmitter. This figure clearly shows
that Bob’s error performance is better than that of Eve.
More sophisticated experiments with the demonstra-
tion of the heterodyne attack and the application to High
dense TV system will be reported in the subsequent pa-
per.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed some security problems
of the quantum stream cipher by Y-00 protocol, in which
the brute force complexity-based security is applied and
a certain condition for the design is given to guarantee
the security. As a result, the quantum stream cipher can
be secure against known/chosen plaintext attacks by the
heterodyne measurement or the quantum unambiguous
measurement during |K ′|/log2M of data bits which cor-
responds to a period of PRNG. Experimentally, we have
implemented and demonstrated the system of the quan-
tum stream cipher by the intensity modulation scheme
with the data rate of 1 Gbps for 20 km long fiber line.
However, the demonstrated system has the security in
which the security of the conventional stream cipher is en-
hanced by quantum noise randomization. This provides
the randomized stream cipher which has high-rate and
high-security that cannot be realized by any kind of the
conventional symmetric key cipher. In the subsequent
experiments, we will implement several randomizations.
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FIG. 1: Design of the basis for amplitude (intensity) modu-
lation
10
(a) Alice-Bob
(b) Alice-Eve
FIG. 2: (Color Online) Eye patterns of Bob(top) and
Eve(bottom). The eye-pattern of Eve has no eye-opening,
which makes it impossible to discriminate with all of the
threshold for the M-ary signals.
